From a social science viewpoint, that the United States courts keep drawing on Katz v. United States 1 in their rulings about whether or not privacy has been violated is difficult to comprehend. This legal case is clearly based on untenable sociological and psychological assumptions. Moreover, many fine legal scholars have laid out additional strong reasons that establish beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unreasonable to draw on "the reasonable expectations of privacy" as a legal concept. Continuing to draw on this concept, especially in the cyber age, undermines the legitimacy of the courts and hence of the law. This Article reviews these arguments in order to further nail down the lid on Katz's coffin so that this case-and the privacy doctrine that draws on it-will be allowed to rest in peace.
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Eight Nails into Katz's Coffin 414 court ruled that he had such an expectation. 2 In other words, when the court holds that it heeds the vox populi, it actually follows the echo of its own voice. Several leading legal scholars find Katz's tautological nature highly problematic. Richard Posner, for example, notes that "it is circular to say that there is no invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will or will not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is." 3 Richard A.
Epstein maintains this:
It is all too easy to say that one is entitled to privacy because one has the expectation of getting it. But the focus on the subjective expectations of one party to a transaction does not explain or justify any legal rule, given the evident danger of circularity in reasoning. 4 Anthony G. Amsterdam points out that the "actual, subjective expectation of privacy . . . can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection." 5 As Professor Amesterdam notes, "the government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing halfhourly on television that . . . we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance." 6 Jed Rubenfeld adds wisely that if expectations of privacy are "tied to what a citizen ought to know about the [law] , Fourth Amendment law becomes a self-validating logical circle in which . . . any judicial decision will vindicate reasonable expectations of privacy (because the judicial decision will itself warrant the expectations or lack of expectations it announces)."
7 By this logic, he concludes, a totalitarian society with government informants in every workplace and household would satisfy the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 8 Richard Seamon extends this criticism, arguing that a "reasonable expectations" test that concludes certain government privacy intrusions do not count as searches "for Fourth Amendment
It is difficult to comprehend why the well-established observation that Katz is tautological is not itself sufficient to lay Katz to rest. Nevertheless, this Article provides several other reasons for ending the Katz standard.
II. Katz Is Subject to Institutional Influence
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard is not only highly malleable by the courts but also is subject to influence by various institutions. Statements made by elected officials, especially the President; laws enacted by Congress; and normative positions developed by religious authorities and public intellectuals all affect what people consider private or an open book.
Along these lines, Shaun Spencer points out that the "expectation-driven conception of privacy" facilitates the erosion of privacy overall by "large institutional actors."
13 That is because powerful institutions can influence the social practices that affect the expectations of privacy "by changing their own conduct or practices, by changing or designing technology to affect privacy, or by Jed Rubenfeld shows that the reasonable expectation of privacy test would allow a simple government announcement that "all telephone calls will henceforth be monitored" to deprive people of their "reasonable expectations of privacy in such calls," retroactively justifying the decree. 16 Put simply by Erwin Chemerinsky, the government "seemingly can deny privacy just by letting people know in advance not to expect any."
17 Richard Julie adds importantly that the ability of legislation and regulation to affect the scope of the Fourth Amendment in this way violates "the core principle of constitutional law, that the legislature may not alter the Constitution by an ordinary statute." 18 Thus, the public's "reasonable expectations" may be altered by any number of factors. The fact that the vox populi is affected not only by the courts but also by myriad other institutions hardly makes it a more reliable, trustworthy or independent criterion for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy.
III. Surveys to the Rescue?
Assuming judges try to live up to the standard they have set and seek to figure out what reasonable people consider private beyond looking into their own innards, to whom should they turn? There are more than three hundred million Americans. Even if one excludes minors and others whose opinion, for one reason or another, the law excludes, a very hefty number remains. There is no reason, and even less evidence, to hold that they all will have the same expectations.
14. Spencer, supra note 13, at 860. Actually, social scientists tend to agree that such surveys may not provide a reliable and appropriate tool on which the courts can rely. Survey results vary depending on (a) who is surveyed, (b) the ways the questions are worded, (c) the sequence in which the questions are asked, (d) the context in which they are asked (e.g., at home versus at work), and (e) the attributes of those who ask the questions. Even when the same question is asked of the same people by the same people twice, rather different answers can follow.
22 These inherent problems are magnified when one seeks opinions about complicated, abstract issues like "privacy" and "surveillance."
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People tend to give answers they believe are expected of them, especially regarding issues that are politically or ideologically divisive. Respondents tend to exaggerate their income, popularity, happiness, and political engagement. 24 Merely changing the phrasing of a Particularly problematic is defining which "society" the Court has in mind when it seeks to determine the societal expectation of privacy. 30 Simply put, whose reasonable expectation matters? Katz's peers? The members of his gambling community? Or the people of the United States of America?
IV. Expectation or Right?
Drawing on the societal expectation of privacy in effect amounts to drawing on consensus. This raises a preliminary question: how much agreement is needed to qualify as "societal" expectation? Total consensus is not found in any society of complexity, even in ones much smaller than the United States. Is an 80 percent agreement enough? A two-thirds majority?
Much more important is the question of whether the courts should be guided by consensus even when it can be accurately determined. True, consensus has a prudential value. The courts should not stray too far from public consensus, lest they lose their legitimacy or stray into a bitter culture war of the kind that occurred around reproductive rights (i.e., decisional privacy). However, consensus has no standing from a normative viewpoint when fundamental rights are at stake. Thus, if an overwhelming majority of Americans agrees that women are second-class citizens or that "fishing expeditions" by the police are fully acceptable because "those who did nothing wrong have nothing to hide," this does not mean that a court should accept this consensus and allow it to trump the court's judgment as to what the Constitution entails and what is just and right. In short, from a normative viewpoint, the expectation of the public as to what and who may or may not be searched should matter little.
Because this point is crucial, an elaboration follows. Katz runs roughshod over the elementary but essential fact that the political system of the United States is not a simple democracy but a liberal democracy. 31 The essence of this regime is that it combines two very distinct principles. The first is majoritarianism: when we differ, we choose our course based on which position garners more votes. The second is liberalism: a set of rights are deliberately ensconced in the Constitution, making them so difficult to amend that one should usually take them as a given. To put it differently, the majority can decide what it prefers as long as this preference does not entail violating anybody's rights to speak freely, to worship, to assemble, to petition, and so on. The right to privacy is one of these rights. Therefore, if the courts were to decide whether a particular situation is covered by the right to privacy based on what the masses told a pollster or what the courts somehow determine the societal view to be-the courts would in effect turn a fundamental right into a massdriven, pliable, ephemeral, ever-changing concept. Thus, Americans showed very little concern for privacy in the months that followed the September 11th attacks on America and much more concern when no new major attacks took place over the next ten years. 32 They are sure to change their collective mind one more time if another attack occurs. If one bases a constitutional right on such a foundation, one might as well tie it to a weather vane. In short, if Katz is allowed to stand and the courts continue to follow it, the result would be to reduce the right of privacy at best to a mere matter of democratic majority rule.
I write "at best" because Katz is not more aligned with the democratic half of the United States regime than it is with the liberal/constitutional half. In deciding those public policy issues that are not covered by rights and are subject to majority rule, the United States counts noses. That is, each person has a vote-whether or not they are reasonable. Katz is decided without any actual votes by the public; the people's views are merely divined.
In short, Katz is either a convenient fiction or a serious violation of the most basic principles of our polity and should be allowed to expire, the sooner the better.
V. Two Prongs Offer Less Protection Than One
Originally, the Katz test consisted of two "prongs" used jointly to determine whether a "reasonable expectation of privacy" existed. 33 In the words of Justice Harlan, " [T] here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 34 Of course, such a dual standard raises this question: what is a court to do when the two standards are in conflict? If the courts ignore the first standard on the 
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grounds that every defendant will claim an expectation of privacy in the matter at hand-why introduce two prongs in the first place? In practice, courts have increasingly ignored the first prong as a "practical matter," for "defendants virtually always claim to have a subjective expectation of privacy" and such claims are difficult to disprove. 35 36 Thus, the expectation of privacy test relies almost exclusively on an objective determination of society's "reasonable" expectations. Among all Katz's flaws, this two-pronged approach is a relatively minor one; it merely adds one more reason to allow this legal concept to fade away. After all, if half the prongs of the Katz test are irrelevant, there is no compelling reason to continue following it.
VI. Katz Is Confronted by the Cyber Age
The reasonable expectation of privacy standard is further undermined by recent technological developments. The rise of social media, Facebook in particular, is a prime example of this trend. Originally intended and promoted as a social networking tool for college students, Facebook's privacy implications have expanded in line with its broadening user base and functionality. There are numerous documented instances of employees being fired over material they, not expecting to share it with their employer, had posted on Facebook. 37 39 Although such evaluations are typically done through Internet searches or mutual friends, in some cases employers and universities demand Facebook passwords from current or prospective employees and students, a practice that, despite controversy, remains legal in the majority of United States. 40 On the other hand, evading this scrutiny by restricting access to or removing personal information from Facebook may also hurt one's job prospects. 41 In addition, Facebook is monitored by intelligence 42 and law enforcement agencies. 43 Following California v. Greenwood, 44 in which the Supreme Court determined that material left outdoors in trash bags was accessible to the public and thus could not reasonably be expected to be private, 45 the Supreme Court has tended to find it reasonable to expect privacy only in acts or spaces unobservable to the general public. 46 As shown by Facebook, however, the evolution and mass adoption of new communications and other technologies tends over time to increase the public visibility of acts people consider private. The Supreme Court has in effect held in recent rulings such as Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States
47 that "the effect of modern life, with its technological and other advances, serves to eliminate or reduce a person's justified expectation of privacy." 48 Along these lines, Helen Nissenbaum notes that the "expectation of privacy" test prevents the Court from ruling against the increasingly prominent practices of public surveillance, which include searching online public records, consumer profiling, data mining, and the use of location technologies such as radio frequency identification (RFID). This is because the test defines movement or activity in public arenas as "implicitly" abandoning "any expectation of privacy." 49 Nissenbaum views this as evidence that "traditional theoretical insights" yield unsatisfactory conclusions in the case of public surveillance.
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VII. Katz Is Undercut by the Third Party Doctrine
Katz is further damaged by the combination of recent technological developments with the "third party doctrine." As stated in United States v. Miller, 51 this doctrine asserts that the "Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities" and that "issuance of a subpoena to a third party does not violate the rights of a defendant."
52 While originally justifying the police subpoena of a suspect's bank records, the third party doctrine has since become a serious impediment to Fourth Amendment restrictions on new surveillance technologies due to the essential role third parties play over the Internet. As a result, argues Stephen Henderson, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in its current form threatens to "render the Fourth Amendment a practical nullity." 53 Whereas the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for surveillance of personal paper mail, for example, the third party doctrine leaves e-mail without similar protection. 54 This impelled Congress to legislate protection for e-mail with the 1986 Stored Communications Act, 55 56 Likewise, Peter Swire warns that increasing use of the Internet, and thus third parties, to conduct phone calls may render the "expectation of privacy" test ineffective even for phone call wiretapping-the original subject of the Katz ruling. 57 In today's era of "big data," which Craig Mundie points out is characterized by the "widespread and perpetual collection and storage" of personal information by third parties 58 and in which individuals and businesses increasingly store information "in the cloud" rather than on their own devices, a traditional privacy paradigm based on secrecy is no longer relevant or useful. Several Supreme Court justices have acknowledged this flaw in Katz jurisprudence. 59 
VIII. Katz Stays Home
Katz will be mourned much less than one might have expected given the excitement with which its arrival was greeted. At the time, Katz was said to be a "revolution" 60 and a "watershed in [F]ourth [A]mendment jurisprudence," 61 and consensus quickly emerged that it was a "landmark decision that dramatically changed Fourth Amendment law." 62 This was, at least in part, because prior to Katz the boundary between that which was private (in the Fourth Amendment sense, requiring a warrant to be searched) and that which was not was largely based on the legal concept that one's home
